s [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

(Aguinaldo and Noriega) were captured. Finally, in one example, the enemy leader (Villa)
escaped. Each case study began with a unique set of circumstances that established decapitation
as a potentially beneficial strategy.
The strategy of decapitation was applied with the intent of coercing, disrupting, deterring,
and/or destroying enemy capabilities through targeting, with military power, the strategic
individual. Each case established the individual as a threat to national security and as the power
center of his system or environment. American national leadership evaluated the enemy s
capabilities and determined the targeted individual to be strategically valuable. The targeting
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process was used, in one way or another, to match the appropriate response to the desired effect,
and the hunt began.
Each case had tactical and strategic outcomes as unique as their beginnings. Risk and
proportionality varied greatly with respect to time and dollars, casualties, and effects. In the cases
of Aguinaldo and Noriega, decapitation achieved both tactical and strategic successes.
Aguinaldo s capture resulted in a marked decline in the Philippine insurgency, set the stage for
colonial government, ultimately led to Philippine independence, and provided America a regional
ally for the last one hundred years. Noriega s imprisonment immediately decreased the threat to
Americans in the Panama Canal region. It also disrupted the drug industry in Panama and
established a friendly government able to take over the Canal Authority in 1999. Yamamoto s
and Escobar s deaths resulted in tangible tactical successes, while the strategic objectives were
left irresolute. Killing the man behind the attack on Pearl Harbor served as a major tactical
success but eliminated a long-term peace advocate. The Yamamoto strike resulted in a benefit-
heavy balance in proportion to the cost and risk. Whatever uncertain strategic benefits came from
his death, by far outweighed the cost/risk of the single successful aerial mission. The hunt for
Escobar, on the other hand, led to bloody vengeance and paved the road for the Calí cartel to
accelerate narcotics growth and profits. Finally, in Mexico, Villa escaped the ten thousand man
Punitive Expedition s one-year pursuit. Tactically, Pershing redeployed to the United States
unfulfilled. Strategically, he circumvented a possible regional war and successfully disrupted
Villa s band. The cumulative results of these five cases provide data required to develop helpful
criteria for similar operations in the future.
Target Value Analysis
Methodically comparing the cumulative results of a specific operation assigns a relative
value to each set of facts. Military terminology calls this comparison a Target Value Analysis
(TVA). In business terminology, a TVA equates to a cost / benefit analysis that determines how
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well, or how poorly a planned action will turn out. Although such tools are most commonly used
for answering financial questions, they can be applied in almost any situation. The cost / benefit
analysis relies on the addition of positive factors and the subtraction of negative factors to
determine a net result. It finds, quantifies, and consolidates all the positive factors equaling the
benefits. Then it identifies, quantifies, and subtracts all the costs. The difference between the two
identifies the more profitable or beneficial option.
Targeting enemy leadership offers very few tangible effects that can provide concrete
evidence in a cost / benefit analysis. Measuring coercion, deterrence, and/or disruption is
problematic and normally requires some time to develop and produce measurable effects. The
TVA methodology therefore prioritizes targets through war-gaming and course of action
comparisons instead. The Targeting Methodology chapter of FM 6-20-10 Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for the Targeting Process explains how the TVA methodology works and its
results.
During war-gaming, alternative friendly COA (courses of action) are analyzed in
terms of their impact on enemy operations and likely responses. The enemy
battlefield functions that must be attacked to force the best enemy response are
identified. The commander and his staff analyze the criticality of friendly [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]